Comments on Inan’s Notions of Objectual and Propositional Curiosity by Mirela Fuš
313
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVI, No. 48, 2016
Comments on Inan’s Notions of 
Objectual and Propositional Curiosity
MIRELA FUŠ*
Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Norway
Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK
In this paper I comment on Inan’s notions of propositional and objectual 
curiosity. Even though Inan offers an interesting and intuitive distinc-
tion between propositional and objectual curiosity, I want to question 
two aspects of his theory of curiosity. One aspect concerns his thesis that 
propositional curiosity is interdependent on epistemic attitudes such as 
belief, certainty and interest. Another aspect of his theory that I discuss 
is his thesis that objectual curiosity is not reducible to propositional cu-
riosity. In more detail, in the fi rst part, I start off by explaining what 
propositional curiosity is according to Inan and I bring up two worries 
that I call: (i) over-complexity as a result of subjectivity and (ii) over-
complexity as a result of dynamics for the above mentioned epistemic 
attitudes. Both worries stress the problem of over-complexity of Inan’s 
theory of propositional curiosity. In the second part, I argue that objec-
tual curiosity is, contrary to Inan’s hypothesis, reducible to propositional 
curiosity. I further argue that the object of wh- questions that, according 
to Inan, express objectual curiosity can either be about the truth value of 
general or singular proposition. In addition, I suggest that only the read-
ing where wh- questions express curiosity in a form of de re reading and 
have a singular proposition as their content is the one that is compatible 
with Inan’s notion of objectual curiosity.
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“The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity 
has its own reason for existing.”
― Albert Einstein
Introduction
What is a curiosity? “A desire to know” (“desire to understand”1) has 
been considered as a cursory defi nition or rather an abbreviation for 
curiosity. Apart from that, the history of philosophy did not have much 
to tell us about curiosity until recently.2 On the other hand, notions 
such as belief, acquaintance, and knowledge have been discussed at 
great length and have earned their place within the philosophical fi elds 
of epistemology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.
Whereas the unknown is our starting point, curiosity is related to 
asking and answering of questioning or queries, and, thus, bringing 
us closer to either ignorance or knowledge. Inan (2014) argues that 
curiosity contributes to epistemic attitudes and achievements. Under 
the assumption that curiosity is an epistemic attitude as well as knowl-
edge is, Inan is curious to discover the relation between curiosity and 
other epistemic attitudes; in particular, for propositional curiosity: a 
“belief that is uncertain,” and for objectual curiosity: “partial acquain-
tance with an object.” Furthermore, he seeks to fi nd a place for curi-
osity within the existing philosophical tradition, and, by offering this 
distinction, he aims to clear up the possible misunderstandings.
The motivation for his theory he fi nds in a direct connection be-
tween curiosity and knowledge. Here I spell out a simple and intuitive 
argument Inan (2014) offers: (i) Knowing is (at least sometimes) an 
epistemic achievement. (ii) Curiosity is one of the basic motivators of 
knowing. (iii) Thus, curiosity is (related to) an epistemic achievement.
However, this becomes more complicated when one wants to show 
how exactly curiosity amounts to knowledge and knowledge related no-
tions such as belief, acquaintance (ostensibility) and ignorance. In par-
ticular, Inan (2014: 143–144) tries to answer the following questions:
“If knowledge is a propositional attitude, is curiosity so too?”
“Is awareness of ignorance a precondition for curiosity?”
“If all knowing is in fact knowing the answer to a question, does it 
then follow that knowledge always originates from curiosity?”
“How does curiosity motivate inquiry into the unknown?”
“How does curiosity relate to the holding of a belief that is uncer-
tain and how does it relate to having partial acquaintance with an 
object?”
In this paper, I focus on Inan’s notions of propositional and objectual 
curiosity as spelled out in his book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012), 
1 See Descartes (1989).
2 Nowadays, after a brief categorical search, one could classify curiosity under 
the scope of virtue epistemology.
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and the ideas that he further developed in his recent paper “Curiosity, 
Belief and Acquaintance” (2014). Inan (2012, 2014) thus contrasts two 
types of curiosity: propositional (Aristotle’s “whether” questions) and 
objectual (“what” questions) curiosity. Propositional curiosity is a prop-
ositional attitude for Inan and it takes the following form: “S is curious 
whether p” where “p” is a proposition. In cases such as “I am curious 
whether it will rain tomorrow,” Inan argues that one is curious about 
the truth value of a proposition in question, namely “it will rain tomor-
row.” The object of propositional curiosity is thus an unknown truth 
value of a proposition. Propositional curiosity has a question form: “is it 
the case that s?” where “s” is a full declarative sentence that expresses 
a proposition. On the other hand, objectual curiosity, for Inan, takes 
the form of wh- questions, such as: “Who is the murderer of Smith?” 
For the objectual curiosity, Inan argues, does not involve curiosity in 
the truth of a proposition because there is no particular proposition one 
is curious about.
Even though Inan offers an interesting and intuitive distinction 
between propositional and objectual curiosity, I want to question two 
aspects of his theory of curiosity. One aspect concerns his thesis that 
propositional curiosity is interdependent on epistemic attitudes such as 
belief, certainty and interest. Another aspect of his theory that I dis-
cuss is his thesis that objectual curiosity is not reducible to propositional 
curiosity. In more detail, in the Part I, I start off by explaining what 
propositional curiosity is for Inan and I bring up two worries that I call: 
(i) over-complexity as a result of subjectivity and (ii) over-complexity as 
a result of dynamics for the above mentioned epistemic attitudes. Both 
worries stress the problem of over-complexity of a theory of proposition-
al curiosity. In the Part II, I argue that objectual curiosity is, contrary 
to Inan’s hypothesis, reducible to propositional curiosity. I will hopefully 
show the analysis under which his thesis comes up short and claim that 
objectual curiosity is, in fact, reducible to a propositional curiosity.
1. Propositional Curiosity
Propositional curiosity for Inan (2014) takes the following form: “S is 
curious whether p” where “p” is a proposition. In cases such as “I am 
curious whether it will rain tomorrow,” one is curious about the truth 
value of a proposition in question, namely, the proposition “it will rain 
tomorrow.” The object of propositional curiosity is thus an unknown 
truth value of a proposition.
Here are some further working assumptions. Inan thinks that a be-
lief comes in degrees as well as curiosity. He further argues that belief 
and curiosity are inversely proportional. If one believes 100%, i.e. if she 
is completely certain in the truth value of the proposition in question, 
then she is not curious at all.
Certainty leaves no room for curiosity since: “Curiosity about wheth-
er a proposition is true or false can only take place under uncertainty” 
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(Inan 2014: 144). One can ask oneself whether a certain proposition is 
true or false only when one is uncertain. In brief, he thinks, dogmat-
ics cannot be curious. Furthermore, certainty is taken here to be an 
epistemic attitude with respect to the truth of a proposition and Inan 
thinks of it as a subjective category, no matter whether the proposition 
is true or false objectively since: “People who are certain of their beliefs 
may not always have the right to be certain” (Inan 2014: 144). He also 
takes utterances such as: “I am certain that p, but I am still curious 
whether p” never to be true because one cannot be 100% certain and 
still be curious, i.e. one’s curiosity is then 0%, which makes this con-
junction false. On the other hand, one can claim: “I believe that p, but I 
am curious whether p” and sometimes be true because one can believe 
something but not be certain, and this opens a possibility for a curios-
ity, at least according to Inan.
Finally, there is another important parameter that also comes in 
degrees and that should be taken into consideration, namely our inter-
est in the object of our curiosity. Inan argues that a relation between 
curiosity and interest is a proportional one. On the other hand, he be-
lieves that a relation between interest and belief is not an easy one, 
but rather a “peculiar” one, and he believes he cannot offer it without a 
further investigation. However, he believes that incorporating interest 
as a parameter should help to explain cases such as:
Lack of certainty only when accompanied with interest motivates curios-
ity. This is why you may hold two separate beliefs having the same degree, 
though you may be curious about the truth of one, and not the other, or you 
may be curious about both, but with different degrees. (Inan 2014: 147)
To sum up, there are various parameters and epistemic attitudes Inan 
thinks that are at play together with propositional curiosity. Moreover, 
different relations among them are quite important. Inan admits that, 
without further investigation, he cannot tell for sure how those three 
parameters relate, i.e. belief, curiosity and interest. However, he ar-
gues that they come in degrees and are not independent epistemic at-
titudes, because if they were, then they would connect to curiosity in a 
more obvious way. He leaves us with a following conclusion:
… for any subject and a proposition that that subject grasps, the degree of 
curiosity in the truth of that proposition will be inversely proportional to 
the degree of belief in the truth of that proposition, but it will be directly 
proportional to the degree of interest in the truth of that proposition. (Inan 
2014: 147; italics mine)
In the remaining two subsections of this part of the paper, I will spell 
out my two worries related to Inan’s notion of propositional curiosity. 
I proceed with the fi rst worry that I call Over-complexity as a Result of 
Subjectivity.
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1.1. First Worry: Over-complexity as a Result of Subjectivity
Let me give you the gist of this worry. Inan believes that: “Curiosity 
can only take place when we come to realize the fallibility of our beliefs” 
(Inan 2014, 145)3. As mentioned above, Inan talks about certainty or 
“a degree of belief” in a subjective sense. For the sake of argument, I 
would like to take into consideration another possible parameter that 
can infl uence our belief: namely context sensitivity. Context sensitivity 
can affect our belief in both objective and subjective sense, i.e. when 
context switches (objective sense) and as our realization (or our failure 
to realize) that context has switched or could switch without us notic-
ing it (subjective sense). In other words, changes in context and our 
(failure of ) tracking it can infl uence our degree of belief. Consequently, 
this would infl uence our degree of curiosity. It seems that our degree of 
curiosity can be changed because of the context sensitivity parameter 
either in objective or subjective sense (or both).
In particular, when taken as an objective parameter, context sensi-
tivity can (but does not have to) infl uence a belief without a subject nec-
essarily having to be directly aware of it, yet it still can affect subject’s 
degree of belief. For example, how certain one is in the proposition that 
it will rain tomorrow depends also on the context. If context changed, 
e.g. if one saw more clouds, one would become less certain that it will 
rain tomorrow. On the other hand, when taken as a subjective param-
eter, i.e. our realization that context changed or could change and we 
would not detect it, can infl uence our degree of belief, in a similar way 
as our realization about fallibility of our beliefs that Inan mentions 
can change our degree of belief and infl uence curiosity. Thus, context 
sensitivity as a parameter could affect curiosity.
Moreover, we could explain a subjective context sensitivity as a pa-
rameter that is connected to the notion of our fallibility realization, 
which is also a subjective notion according to Inan. In this sense, our 
realization about our fallibility could also include a realization that all 
sorts of other parameters (context sensitivity included) can play a role 
in (a possible) change of our beliefs when things go wrong and when a 
change is not detected properly. These subjective realizations could, 
thus, motivate our curiosity.4
3 Timothy Williamson (in personal discussions) pointed out that what is going 
completely astray with Inan’s strategy is that he is focusing all the time on belief when 
the curiosity has to do with knowledge. For example, Williamson strongly disagrees 
with the above claim that “Curiosity can only take place when we come to realize 
the fallibility of our beliefs” (Inan 2014: 145). He believes that somebody who has no 
awareness of their own fallibility can also be curious, let’s say, about what is inside 
of the box. For if you don’t know what is inside the box, you can still have a desire to 
know what is inside the box. This is for Williamson a result of his commitment that 
curiosity acquires a desire to acquire knowledge. However, for the sake of argument, 
I will proceed with Inan’s notion about one’s realization of one’s fallibility.
4 The objective context sensitivity can still play a role, in sense that it could infl uence 
curiosity indirectly via our subjective realization that context has perhaps changed.
318 M. Fuš, Comments on Inan’s Notions
One could further argue that some other (sub)parameters and our 
subjective realization of their existence can affect our belief. In other 
words, once we allow the subjectivity into our account of a degree of 
belief, how do we know where to stop? For instance, allowing a sub-
jective notion of certain parameters which includes our realization of 
the fallibility of our beliefs could leave us room to introduce numerous 
other subjective parameters that subject might have and that could 
consequently affect one’s curiosity. This would make the interdepen-
dence between these parameters and curiosity even more peculiar. 
Consequently, explaining curiosity as relying on the other epistemic 
attitudes and parameters could become extremely complex.
Finally, I believe this could turn out problematic in two ways: (i) 
too complex for the subject to grasp, and (ii) too complex for a theory of 
propositional curiosity. First, it would presuppose either (a) subject’s 
extremely high-order ability to grasp many real and also possible com-
plex relations and parameters which can infl uence her curiosity, or, on 
the contrary, (b) subject’s failure or incapacity to grasp (all or some of) 
these parameters. I think both cases seek further explanation. Second, 
a theory of curiosity that could possibly include so many parameters 
related to degree of one’s belief, might turn out to be over-complex and 
metaphysically too rich. This sort of explanation of propositional curi-
osity puts a lot of weight on the subjective relations that might have 
infl uence on curiosity. There might be another, more simple, way of 
explaining curiosity, without using such a complex theory of explana-
tion and putting so much demand on the subject’s cognitive capacity.
1.2. Second Worry: Over-complexity as a Result of Dynamics
Inan assumes that in order to be uncertain about something and then 
become curious one has to have an object of her curiosity. In case of 
propositional curiosity, for him, this is a truth value of proposition. 
However, apart from being an object of curiosity, the truth value of 
proposition can also be taken as an object of a belief or an interest in the 
following forms (1)–(3):
(1) S believes that p
(2) S has interest in p
(3) S is curious about p
Since Inan admits that belief, interest and curiosity are related, and 
some of them, such as interest and belief are related in a “peculiar” 
way, I am wondering about the possibility of different inner dynamics 
of these epistemic attitudes. Is it a dynamic of a conjunctions or some-
thing else? 
I offer some possible structures of complex epistemic attitudes and 
their dynamics: (a) Vertical dynamics (5), (b) Horizontal dynamics (6), 
(c) Vertical-horizontal dynamics (7), where (4) is a zero-order epistemic 
attitude.
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(4) (0-order epistemic attitude) It will rain tomorrow. (T/F)
(a) Vertical dynamics
(5) (1st-order epistemic attitude) I believe that it will rain tomor-
row.
 (1st-order epistemic attitude) I have interest in whether it will 
rain tomorrow.
 (1st-order epistemic attitude) I am curious whether it will rain 
tomorrow.
Vertical dynamics would presuppose dynamics between different fi rst-
order epistemic attitudes, i.e. belief, interest and curiosity, towards the 
same proposition, i.e “it will rain tomorrow.” For example, one could at 
the same time hold a belief, have interest, and be curious whether it 
will rain tomorrow.
(b) Horizontal dynamics
(6) (3rd-order epistemic attitude) I am curious about my interest in 
my belief that it will rain tomorrow.
Horizontal dynamics would presuppose dynamics within one third-
order epistemic attitude, i.e. belief, interest and curiosity, towards the 
same proposition, i.e “it will rain tomorrow.” For example, one could be 
curious about one’s interest in one’s belief that it will rain tomorrow.
(c) Vertical-horizontal dynamics
(7) (1st-order epistemic attitude) I believe that it will rain tomor-
row.
 (2nd-order epistemic attitude) I am curious about my belief that 
it will rain tomorrow.
 (3rd-order epistemic attitude) I am curious about my interest in 
my belief that it will rain tomorrow.
Vertical-horizontal dynamics presupposes dynamics that would be a 
combination of vertical and horizontal dynamics. For example, one 
could at the same time hold a belief, be curious about one’s belief, and 
be curious about one’s interest in one’s belief that it will rain tomorrow.
Since, in examples (5)–(7), all the three parameters come in degree, 
they could also infl uence one another and one could become more or 
less curious depending on what is going on between these epistemic at-
titudes. If we also allow a horizontal and horizontal-vertical dynamics, 
things might get really fuzzy. Thus, I would be curious to know more 
about their inner dynamics.
The moral of the second worry is partly analogous with the fi rst worry: 
if we allow some other epistemic attitudes into account, those relations 
might get really over-complicated to explain propositional curiosity.
2. Objectual Curiosity
Inan contrasts two types of curiosity: propositional (Aristotle’s “wheth-
er” questions) with objectual (“what” questions). As explained in the 
Part 1, propositional curiosity has a question form: “is it the case that 
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s?” where “s” is a full declarative sentence that expresses a proposition. 
Object of it is an unknown truth value and he takes it to be a proposi-
tional attitude. On the other hand, according to Inan, objectual curios-
ity takes the form of wh- questions, such as: “Who is the murderer of 
Smith?” For the latter, namely, objectual curiosity, Inan argues that it 
does not involve curiosity in the truth of a proposition because: 
there is no particular proposition in the form [a is the murderer] of which 
Holmes is curious to know. So my hypothesis is that being curious who 
someone is, or being curious when or where or how or why some event took 
place need not involve curiosity in the truth of a proposition. (Inan 2014: 
148)
Furthermore, Inan thinks that a degree of belief is not applicable for ob-
jectual curiosity. Instead, he introduces a new epistemic parameter to 
explain the objectual curiosity—a degree of ostensibility, which he gets 
out of the notion of acquaintance that he takes to be: “an extensional 
notion, whereas what we need is an intensional one, that is, we need 
a notion that is sensitive not only to the degree of acquaintance of the 
object of curiosity, but also to what concept you represent that object 
in your mind” (Inan 2014: 152). For Inan, curiosity requires a concep-
tualization or a representation of its object: “The degree of curiosity is 
then a function of the degree of ostensibility of that concept. The no-
tion of acquaintance is still relevant, but in an indirect way. We may 
defi ne the ostensibility of a concept for a subject in terms of the degree 
of acquaintance of the object (determined by that concept) under that 
concept” (Inan 2014: 153).
To sum up: for Inan, propositional curiosity is: “a function of [one’s] 
degree of belief and [one’s] degree of interest when there is a full propo-
sition involved” (Inan 2014: 148). On the other hand, objectual curiosity 
is: “a function of two factors: degree of interest and degree of ostensibil-
ity. It is directly proportional to the former and inversely proportional 
to the latter” (Inan 2014: 152).
Even though I, in principle, fi nd Inan’s distinction intuitive, I want 
to focus on Inan’s thesis that objectual curiosity is not a propositional 
attitude. Inan believes that there is a difference between: “the logical 
status of belief and objectual curiosity [that] reveals itself in surface 
grammar” (Inan 2014: 149). Inan further argues that when Holmes 
is curious about: “Who is the murderer of Smith?”, the sentence has a 
form of: “S is curious about the F”, namely (8) will expresses the truth.
(8) Holmes is curious about the murderer of Smith. 
However, Inan thinks that if we switched from “is curious” to “believes” 
as in sentences (9) or (10) below, both (9) and (10) would be ungram-
matical.
(9) Holmes believes about the murderer of Smith.
(10) Holmes believes the murderer.
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He further argues that this kind of interrogative sentence does not con-
tain a full proposition and, more importantly, that there is no propo-
sition that can be singled out of which Holmes might want to know 
whether that proposition is true or false, as might be the case with 
propositional curiosity. 
Furthermore, Inan rightly thinks that introducing a long disjunc-
tive proposition, such as (11) below, and being curious which of these 
propositions is true cannot help in all cases because Holmes might not 
have any actual nor possible suspects, yet he could still be curious who 
the murderer is. 
(11) Ralph is the murderer of Smith or Brown is the murderer of 
Smith or … 
He also points out that: “being curious about who the murderer is, is 
not the same thing as being curious about which disjunct is true in a 
disjunction” (Inan 2014: 150). Even if we could formulate a very long 
disjunction with all the possible answers, one couldn’t grasp this long 
proposition, he argues. 
2.1. Two Readings of Inan’s Objectual Curiosity
In the rest of this paper I would like to offer a different, yet familiar 
and somewhat neutral approach to this issue. I would like to argue that 
there is such a proposition Holmes believes when he becomes curious 
about the murderer of Smith. I believe that (8) can be translated into 
(12): 
(12) Holmes believes that somebody is the murderer of Smith.
Thus, Holmes is curious about somebody. He thinks that somebody did 
it.
Let me qualify this a bit further. The two examples, (13) and (8), 
depict what Inan calls propositional curiosity (13), and objectual curi-
osity (8): 
Propositional curiosity
(13) Holmes is curious if Jones is the murderer of Smith. 
In (13) Holmes is curious about the truth value of (14), namely whether 
this proposition is true or false.
(14) Jones is the murderer of Smith.
Objectual curiosity
(8) Holmes is curious about the murderer of Smith.
In (8) Holmes is curious about who is the murderer of Smith.
The hard question is: if Holmes is curious about who killed Smith, 
what is the proposition that he has in mind? One can argue that it is 
already a background assumption that somebody killed Smith and that 
(13) is thus true by default, but that the real question is not whether 
someone killed Smith, but who did it? In other words, one can say that 
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the proposition saying that somebody killed Smith is presupposed and 
that is true, yet what we really want to know is who is the person that 
killed Smith. For this reason, I propose two possible readings of (12), 
i.e. reading (12a) and (12b) below:
Reading A 
(12a) Holmes believes that this is true: Somebody is the murderer of 
Smith.
where (12a) represents de dicto (general) reading: it is who ever hap-
pens to kill Smith.
Reading B
(12b) Somebody is such that Holmes believes that he is the murderer of 
Smith.
where (12b) represents de re (singular) reading: the person who killed 
Smith. I also propose the reading of somebody from (12b) as Kaplan’s 
(1989a, 1989b) indexical.5
I believe that (8) can be spelled grammatically in the manner of (12). 
Furthermore, I believe that (12) has two satisfactions, one is satisfi ed 
by de dicto reading, i.e. (12a), and another by de re reading, i.e. (12b). 
Moreover, there is a distinction in the scope of the defi nite descrip-
tion somebody is the murderer of Smith. In the Reading A, the defi -
nite description has narrow scope, within the scope of ‘believes’. In the 
Reading B, the defi nite description has wide scope, in effect “picking 
out” an individual and then ascribing to Holmes a belief about that in-
dividual. The Reading A is a de dicto ascription of belief (relating him 
to a dictum, a complete proposition), whereas the Reading B is a de re 
ascription of belief (relating him to an individual, a res, that his belief 
is about).
When one wants to say that certain beliefs are true or false one 
takes ‘belief’ to mean thought-content (see Boër 2007: 35). Depending 
on whether reading is de dicto or de re, belief-states that are reported 
will have different contents: “One who takes a belief-state to involve 
a relation to a proposition might then be tempted to suppose that the 
content of a de dicto belief is a wholly general proposition and the con-
tent of a de re belief is a singular proposition” (Boër 2007: 35).6
5 Kripke’s (1970/1980) modal argument has been used by Kaplan (1977/1989: 512–
13) to argue that demonstratives refer directly and express singular propositions.
6 Let me briefl y explain a standard distinction between a general and a singular 
proposition. If one takes propositions to be structured objects and that they can 
contain objects and can contain properties, then some of the propositions are not 
going to contain any objects but just properties—namely, the general ones. Those are 
the ones that are about objects if they are about objects and only by way of properties, 
only qua possessors of properties, whereas the structured propositions that have 
objects right in them do not need to get these objects by way of properties, objects are 
already in there—those are the singular ones (see Fitch and Nelson 2013).
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That would mean that de dicto reading of (12), namely (12a), takes a 
general proposition as its content, whereas de re reading of (12), name-
ly (12b), takes a singular proposition as its content. Furthermore, when 
the content of belief-state that takes form of wh- questions is a singular 
proposition (as in 12b), a thought that is expressed in such a proposi-
tion is often called a singular thought.7, 8
From that we could say that examples that Inan classifi es as the 
ones of “objectual curiosity” can have two readings, i.e. de dicto and 
de re. I claimed that both of these readings have propositions as its 
contents, yet different ones, i.e. one having a general, and another sin-
gular proposition as its content. In this sense what Inan calls objectual 
curiosity can be spelled out or is reducible to the propositional one in 
the sense that there is indeed a proposition that one has in mind. In 
(12a), i.e. in de dicto reading, the truth of the general proposition might 
as well be presupposed. However, this seems not to be the proposition 
Inan (2014) is interested in to call it objectual curiosity. In particular, 
I believe that (12) when read as (12a), or de dicto, would be compatible 
with “propositional curiosity” according to Inan’s terminology, and only 
when read as (12b), or de re, (12) would be compatible with objectual 
curiosity according to Inan’s terminology.9
Conclusion
My aim in this paper was to comment on two aspects of Inan’s notions 
of curiosity: i.e. propositional and objectual curiosity. In the fi rst part 
of this paper, I have expressed two worries concerning the epistemic at-
titudes and parameters that Inan takes to be relevant for propositional 
curiosity. Both worries that I bring up, namely the over-complexity as 
7 There are three dominant theories of singular thought, namely Acquaintance 
Theory of singular thought (see Burge 1977, Donnellan 1979, Lewis 1979, Evans 
1982, Boer and Lycan 1986, Bach 1987/94, Salmon 1988, Brewer 1999, Recanati 
1993, Soames 2003, Pryor 2007), Semantic Instrumentalism (see Harman 1977, 
Kaplan 1989a) and Cognitive Authority or Cognitivism (see Jeshion 2002, 2009, 
2010). (See Fuš 2013a: 201; also see Fuš 2013b).
8 As mentioned, there are different theories of singular thoughts and, at this 
point, I remain neutral, whether one could perhaps also accept the adopted version 
of Inan’s (2010, 2012) theory of ostensibility to accommodate such belief-state.
9 Timothy Williamson (in personal discussions) claims that curiosity is 
propositional because there is a desire for some x one knows that x is the murderer. 
Williamson fi nds de re/de dicto distinction I introduced relevant, because he thinks 
that in case when one is curious about who is the murderer of Smith, the knowledge 
that one wants to acquire is de re knowledge of somebody, namely the murderer. In 
other words, he thinks that de re/de dicto distinction I introduced is relevant because 
it is a desire for a certain sort of de re knowledge. However, he also rightly pointed 
out that a desire to have a de re attitude of a certain sort, isn’t itself de re. 
My quick reply to this worry is that precisely because (12) has two satisfactions, 
namely de re or de dicto, only when one’s belief-state objectively satisfi es de re reading 
(in which case one could also perhaps claim that one possesses de re knowledge), one 
is curious objectively (in Inan’s terms).
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a result of subjectivity and the over-complexity as a result of dynamics, 
point at the theoretical over-complexity as a result of Inan’s theory of 
propositional curiosity. In the second part of this paper, I have focused 
on Inan’s thesis that objectual curiosity is not reducible to propositional 
curiosity because there is no proposition in question one can be curious 
about. In other words, Inan argues that there is no proposition Hol-
mes has in mind when he is curious about the murderer of Smith. My 
claim, against Inan’s thesis, is that objectual curiosity also comes in a 
form of a proposition. I have argued that there is indeed a proposition 
that Holmes has in mind when he is curious about the murderer of 
Smith. I claimed that when Holmes does not have any actual nor pos-
sible suspects to point at or call by name, he can still be curious who the 
suspect is, and that does not mean he does not have any proposition on 
his mind. I have argued that the object of wh- questions that express 
curiosity can either be about the truth value of general or singular 
proposition. In addition, I have suggested that only the reading where 
wh- questions express curiosity in a form of de re reading and have a 
singular proposition as their content is the one that is compatible with 
Inan’s notion of objectual curiosity.
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